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May 1998
Fair Value
ROGER BERNHARDT
The history of foreclosure law is too often a story of well-meant attempts to protect debtors
that generally turned out to do more harm than good. The common law provided for “strict
foreclosure,” i.e., if a mortgagor failed to redeem, the property was turned over to the mortgagee
directly, without a sale, to satisfy the debt. During the last century, legislatures became
convinced that strict foreclosure was wrongly eliminating mortgagors’ equities in their
properties. As a result, state legislatures replaced it with foreclosure by sale: the idea was that the
property would sell at foreclosure for its full value and the mortgagor would get the surplus,
which would save the mortgagor’s equity in the property.
It didn’t turn out that way, however. Foreclosure sales generally produced less than the full
value of the properties sold. Mortgagors were more commonly becoming subject to deficiency
judgments rather than the recipients of surpluses. (Under strict foreclosure, an attempt to get a
money judgment if the property was not equal to the debt was basically impossible; deficiency
judgments arose only with sale foreclosures.)
Postsale Redemption
The California legislative response to “underbidding” was to attempt to coerce bidders into
bidding more by adopting the statutory device of postsale redemption: give the mortgagor a year
to buy the property back from the foreclosure purchaser by tendering what the purchaser paid at
the foreclosure sale. CCP §§726(e), 729.010–729.090. That way—so the thinking went—
potential bidders would be deterred from bidding too low because the lower the bid, the greater
the likelihood that the debtor would redeem, thereby destroying the bidder’s bargain. Thus,
Justice Traynor opined that the primary purpose of the postsale redemption right is to force the
purchaser “to bid the property in at a price approximating its fair value.” Salsbery v Ritter (1957)
48 C2d 1, 11, 306 P2d 897.
“[B]idders find in statutory redemption a disincentive to bid more, because it robs them for the
next year of both possession of the property and certainty of ownership.”
Like its predecessor idea of requiring a foreclosure sale instead of permitting strict foreclosure,
however, this new right of redemption (commonly referred to as “statutory redemption”) rarely
does what it is supposed to do. Rather, bidders find in statutory redemption a disincentive to bid
more, because it robs them for the next year of both possession of the property and certainty of
ownership. Our courts now recognize statutory redemption as an influence that, rather than
increasing prices, reduces them.
Fair Market Value
This observation leads us to a discussion of the next legislative response to unfair
“forfeitures”—fair market value. In many states, a deficiency judgment is not measured by the
amount bid at the judicial foreclosure sale, but rather by the fair market value of the property.
The new Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) §8.4(d) (1997), thus provides:
If it is determined that the fair market value is greater than the foreclosure sale price, the persons
against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are entitled to an offset against the deficiency
in the amount by which the fair market value . . . exceeds the sale price.
Accordingly, underbidding at the sale will not cause a double loss to the mortgagor.

California goes even further. Code of Civil Procedure §726 adopts as the limiting standard for
deficiencies the phrase “fair value,” rather than fair market value. Fair value was plainly intended
to mean something different from fair market value because the statute was amended in 1937 to
replace “fair market value” with “fair value.”
San Paolo
The reason for all this background is to lead up to the recent case of San Paolo U.S. Holding
Co. v 816 S. Figueroa Co. (1998) 62 CA4th 1010, 73 CR2d 272, reported at p 107. That decision
adopts a workable definition of fair value while realistically recognizing that postsale redemption
has an “adverse impact” on bidding. San Paolo holds that fair value is the same as fair market
value—i.e., what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in an open market—except that fair
value would not reflect the fact that the sale is a foreclosure sale subject to statutory redemption,
with consequently lower bids. Thus, if the property would command $1 million on the open
market, but foreclosure bidders are willing to bid only $900,000 (because of postsale
redemption), the fair value of the property is $1 million, not $900,000.
Lenders can certainly complain about the math; it probably assures mortgagees that they will
suffer noncompensable losses in their deficiency judgments. If a court is to assume that
redemption reduces prices, then any price bid at a redeemable foreclosure sale by definition must
be below fair market value. In other words, the fair value must be higher than what was bid at the
sale (and the deficiency judgment accordingly smaller).
The mortgagee’s loss, however, may not be permanent. If the mortgagee is the winning bidder
at the foreclosure sale, it can probably eliminate the loss by reselling (in a truly open market
transaction) a year later. Recapture of the spread between fair value and fair market value should
further induce mortgagees not to let third parties outbid them in this underbidding context.
San Paolo’s definition of fair value is also easy to work with: it is what a listing broker would
say the property could be sold for, and appraisal testimony will be easy to produce. (“Fair market
value on foreclosure,” on the other hand, would have been a much harder number to derive.)
“San Paolo rejected a rival concept of fair value that could have meant disaster.”
What Could Have Been
Most importantly, San Paolo rejected a rival concept of fair value that could have meant
disaster. The court could have defined fair value—as the North Dakota Supreme Court did in
Schiele v First Nat’l Bank (ND 1989) 436 NW2d 248, 249—as the number that produces “a fair
and equitable result between the parties.” In California, Rainer Mortgage v Silverwood, Ltd.
(1985) 163 CA3d 359, 209 CR 294, intimated such treatment by more or less equating fair value
with intrinsic value. The consequences of that kind of interpretation were made obvious by the
appraiser for the mortgagor in San Paolo, who, following Rainer’s line of reasoning, concluded
that the security had a fair value of $5.1 million, even though the lender had acquired it for only
$1.5 million at the foreclosure sale and had then resold it for $1 million to a third party. In the
appraiser’s opinion, the current (1995) market value was irrelevant because the market was
depressed, and the “intrinsic” or “inherent” value of the property was what it was worth during
the years 1985–1989, when the market was not depressed, i.e., was “normal.” How would you
like to be up against appraisal testimony like that?
I recommend that lenders not be too upset that our existing fair-value test ignores the fact that
postsale redemption hurts prices and charges lenders for it. Compared with what might have
been, it is a small price to pay for the certainty of being able to use real values rather than
impressions of what properties would be worth if only things were different from what they are.

